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Should incarcerated sex offenders be given reduced Fifth Amendment
constitutional protections in order to advance the states' interests of
rehabilitation, deterrence, and societal protection? Sex offenders are a
serious threat to society, especially to juveniles.' The rate of recidivism for
sex offenders is higher than for any other type of criminal, thus creating a
vital state interest in rehabilitating these offenders.2 It has been proven that
rehabilitative programs help reduce recidivism by teaching sex offenders to
manage their impulses.3  However, "[a]n important component of those
rehabilitation programs requires participants to confront their past and accept
responsibility for their misconduct.",4 This poses a problem when inmates
are ordered to participate in a rehabilitation program that requires full
acceptance and disclosure of all sexual crimes and misconduct, but retains
the right to report these disclosures for potential prosecution.5 The prisoner
is now presented with a difficult choice: 1) incriminate himself and risk the
possibility of prosecution for past crimes; 2) incriminate himself and risk a
perjury charge for now admitting to a crime that he denied at trial; or 3)
refuse to incriminate himself, by way of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent, and then face consequences for failing to participate in a
court-ordered program.6
This situation provides a penalty for either choice: if the inmate speaks,
he faces penalization; if he remains silent, he faces the imposition of
negative consequences. The Court has determined that certain types of
penalties can compel incriminating testimony, thus creating a Fifth
Amendment violation.8 Therefore, how can a rehabilitation program that
creates the above conditions be constitutional under the Fifth Amendment?
Courts have struggled with this question for years. In the process of
finding the answer, "[they] . .. have unevenly applied the [Fifth
Amendment] right to convicted sex offenders who, as a condition of court-
1. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002). The majority of reported sex offenses in 1995 were
committed against persons under 18 years of age. Id.
2. See id. at 32-33 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 27 (1997)).
3. Lile, 536 U.S. at 33.
"[Tihe rate of recidivism of treated sex offenders is fairly consistently estimated to be
around 15%,' whereas the rate of recidivism of untreated offenders has been estimated to
be as high as 80%. 'Even if both of these figures are exaggerated, there would still be a
significant difference between treated and untreated individuals."
Id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NAT. INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER xiii (1988)).
4. Lile, 536 U.S. at 33. Denial greatly impedes therapy. Id. (citing H. Barbaree, Denial and
Minimization Among Sex Offenders: Assessment and Treatment Outcome, 3 F. ON CORRECTIONS
RES. 30 (1991)). "[O]ffenders who deny all allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely
to fail in treatment than those who admit even partial complicity." Id.
5. Id. at 33-34.
6. Jamie Tanabe, Right Against Self-Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawaii's Sex
Offender Treatment Program Violate The Fifth Amendment, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 825, 826 (2001).
7. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 279 (1998).
8. Lile, 536 U.S. at 49-50.
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ordered therapy, must admit responsibility for their crime." 9  The law
requires that the protection against compulsion and self-incrimination be
afforded to every citizen, but it does not provide the framework for
determining what consequences will create compulsion in the prison
setting.1° The Supreme Court has attempted to make this determination by
defining "incrimination" and "compulsion"; distinguishing the imposition of
a penalty versus the removal of a privilege; stressing the importance of
inmate rehabilitation; and combining these concepts to form guidelines."
This note examines the Court's decision in McKune v. Lile 2 and
discusses the implications of the Court's decision on the standards utilized
for determining what conditions create a Fifth Amendment violation in the
prison context.13  Part II provides background information on the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Part III presents the facts and
procedural history of Lile, followed by an analysis of the plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Part IV. Part V discusses the judicial,
legislative and social implications of Lile. Part VI suggests possible
solutions for avoiding the social implications and further constitutional
claims. Finally, Part VII concludes with an overview of the likely
ramifications of the Court's decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination
No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation. 14
"The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provides us with
some of our most treasured protections-preservation of our autonomy,
privacy, and dignity against the threat of state coercion."' 5 It guarantees the
9. Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing Rehabilitation Without
Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347 (1998).
10. See Lile, 536 U.S. at 36-37.
11. Id. at 29-40.
12. 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (plurality opinion).
13. See id. at 29-40.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. State v. Reyes, 2 P.3d 725, 733 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "[c]ourt-ordered programs
that require convicted sex offenders to admit responsibility for the offense of which they were
right to remain silent when faced with the possibility of incriminating
oneself and protects us against the use of coerced confessions. 16 The right
not only applies in a defendant's criminal trial, but also "privileges him not
to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in
future criminal proceedings.' 7  The Fifth Amendment right "has two
components: incrimination and compulsion.' ' 18  In order for the right to
apply, a person must first have an appreciable fear of incrimination and then
must be compelled to make an incriminating statement.' 9
B. Components of the Fifth Amendment
1. Incrimination
"The [right against self-incrimination] protects the dignity of the
individual by ascribing sanctity to his freedom to keep private information
about himself., 20  It attaches only when a people have real fear of
incriminating themselves. 2' "The danger of self-incrimination must be 'real
and appreciable .. not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial
character... so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to
influence his conduct."' 22  Although the Fifth Amendment right is
guaranteed by the Constitution, there are some restrictions.23 The Supreme
Court has stated that the right "against self-incrimination does not terminate
convicted under threat of probation revocation and imprisonment violate these protections.")
(quoting Kaden, supra note 9, at 390-9 1).
[The privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
Ia fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;' our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life; [and] our distrust of self-deprecatory statements ....
Kaden, supra note 9, at 352-53 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964))
(citations omitted).
16. Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
17. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
18. Lile, 224 F.3d at 1179.
19. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
20. Kaden, supra note 9, at 353.
21. See Lile, 224 F.3d at 1179; Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969) (upholding
convictions of defendants on grounds that there is no real likelihood of incrimination and only "real
and appreciable" risks support a Fifth Amendment claim).
22. Tanabe, supra note 6, at 833 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896)); see also
Lile, 224 F.3d at 1179 (stating that "[iuf the possibility of incrimination is too speculative or
insubstantial, the privilege does not attach.").
23. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002).
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at the jailhouse door," but that lawful incarceration does place limitations on
a defendant's exercise of that right. 24
2. Compulsion
The second component of the Fifth Amendment right is compulsion.
Compulsion entails the government coercing an individual to disclose
incriminating information. 26 "[T]he Supreme Court emphasized that.., the
imposition of penalties is the mechanism by which persons are compelled to
incriminate themselves."27 The Court has stated that unless a person is given
immunity before providing potentially incriminating testimony, he cannot be
forced to choose between answering questions and being punished for
exercising his right to remain silent. 28  Compulsion is generally not
presumed to exist; rather, an individual must first invoke the right against
self-incrimination in order for the court to find that he answered against his
will.
29
Therefore, once individuals assert their rights, they cannot be required to
answer a question if they reasonably believe it will be incriminating.3 °
However, "if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures
instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to
incriminate himself."' 31  Accordingly, witnesses may always voluntarily
testify in matters that may incriminate them; the Fifth Amendment does not
preclude this.32 Witnesses will only be considered to have been 'compelled'
when they have claimed the protection and are then coerced to testify.
33
3. When the Express Assertion of the Right Against Self-Incrimination
Is Waived
There are two situations in which the Court has declared that the right
24. Id.
25. Lile, 224 F.3d at 1179.
26. Tanabe, supra note 6, at 834.
27. Lile, 224 F.3d at 1180; see also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-05 (1977).
28. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661 (1976) (indicating that where the assertion of
the privilege is penalized it "foreclos[es] a free choice to remain silent[] and therefore ... compel[s]
the incriminating testimony."); Lile, 224 F.3d at 1180-81.
29. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
30. See id.
31. Garner, 424 U.S. at 654. "Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were once said to
have 'waived' it, but [the Supreme Court has] recently abandoned this 'vague term' . . . and 'made
clear that an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and
intelligent waiver."' Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984) (quoting Garner, 424 U.S.
at 654 n.9).
32. Garner, 424 U.S. at 654.
33. Monia, 317 U.S. at 427.
against self-incrimination is self-executing: custodial interrogations and
penalty cases.34 The custodial setting contains "inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."35 The
Court thus presumes the presence of coercive government conduct in
custodial settings where there has been a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement. 36 "Therefore, because of the 'inherently compelling'
nature of custodial interrogations, the right against self-incrimination need
not be asserted. 37
A penalty situation is where "the State not only compel[s] an individual
to appear and testify, but also [seeks] to induce him to forgo the Fifth
Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions
'capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.' ' '38
In penalty cases, the defendant is basically left with no choice at all. He
either has to face a penalty for invoking his right against self-incrimination
or incriminate himself to avoid being penalized. 39 The Supreme Court has
declared this situation intolerable and therefore does not require an
individual to invoke the right for protection when in a penalty situation.40
III. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
In 1983, a jury convicted Robert G. Lile (Lile) for rape, aggravated
sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping, although he maintained that the sex
was consensual.41  Both the Kansas Supreme Court and Federal District
Court upheld the conviction.42 In 1994, a few years before Lile was to be
released, he was ordered by prison officials to participate in a Sexual Abuse
Treatment Program (SATP). 43  The SATP required its participants to
complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form and to complete a
sexual history form. 4 These forms required participating inmates to discuss
34. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-34.
35. Id. at 430 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
To dissipate 'the overbearing compulsion ... caused by isolation of a suspect in []
custody,' the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained
during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the consequences
of his failure to assert it.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.5 (1977))
(citation omitted).
36. id.
37. Tanabe, supra note 6, at 835.
38. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434.
39. Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1966).
40. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434.
41. Lile, 536 U.S. at 29. Lile lured a high school girl into his car and forced her, at gunpoint, to
perform oral sodomy on him. He then proceeded to drive her to a field to rape her. Id. at 30.
42. Id.
43. Id. The SATP is an 18-month program that provides daily counseling. Id. at 34.
44. Lile, 536 U.S. at 30. Participants were required to take a polygraph exam to verify the
information provided on the forms. Id. Experts argue that the polygraph examination is not really
considered a valid psychological test. The rates of consistency and standardization need to be
higher. Tanabe, supra note 6, at 853-54.
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and accept responsibility for the crimes for which they were imprisoned and
to discuss the details of any prior sexual activities, regardless of whether
these other acts would constitute uncharged criminal offenses.45
Unfortunately for the prisoners, the information the SATP requires them to
provide is not privileged.46 In fact, Kansas law requires any uncharged
sexual offenses involving minors to be reported to officials.47
Once aware of the SATP requirements, Lile refused to participate in the
program.48 As a result of his refusal, prison officials informed him that he
would be transferred to a maximum-security prison and a four-person,
instead of two-person, cell.49 Additionally, "his privilege status would be
reduced from Level III to Level I.' '5o This reduction would affect his
"visitation rights, earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to
family, canteen expenditures, access to a personal television, and other
privileges."'" Lile based his refusal to participate in the SATP on the ground
that "the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 52
In response to the threats made by Kansas prison officials, Lile brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison warden and the
secretary of the department. 53 He was seeking an injunction to stop them
from revoking his privileges.54 The United States District Court for the
District of Kansas entered summary judgment for Lile, concluding that the
consequences for his refusal to participate in the SATP constituted coercion
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.5 5  It also stated that "because
respondent had testified at trial that his sexual intercourse with the victim
was consensual, an acknowledgement of responsibility for the rape on the
'Admission of Guilt' form would subject respondent to a possible charge of
perjury. 56
45. Lile, 536 U.S. at 29. A polygraph examination was administered to verify the accuracy of the
offender's statements about his sexual history. Id.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id. There is no evidence that incriminating information has ever been disclosed by the SATP
leading to the prosecution of an inmate. Id.
48. Id. at 31.
49. This maximum-security unit would be a more dangerous environment than the unit Lile was
currently occupying and would remain in if he participated in the program. Id.
50. Lile, 536 U.S. at 30.





56. Lile, 536 U.S. at 31.
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision." It
held that "the compulsion element of a Fifth Amendment claim can be
established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. 58 It found that the reduction
in prison privileges and housing status was a penalty because of its
substantial impact on Lile and "because that impact was identical to the
punishment imposed by the Department for serious disciplinary
infractions., 59 The court did, however, acknowledge that the Kansas policy
served important interests of rehabilitation and public safety, but concluded
that those interests could be met without violating the Constitution.6 °
Following this decision, the warden petitioned to the U.S Supreme Court for
certiorari and the request was granted.61
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Plurality Ruling
Delivering a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy began his analysis by
giving a brief overview of the Kansas Sexual Abuse Treatment Program
(SATP) and the interests served by refusing to offer immunity to
participants.62 It was first stated that the program, in order for participants to
understand their behavior and how to prevent recidivism, requires accepting
responsibility for past offenses.63  Additionally, the potential for further
punishment reinforces the gravity of the sex offenders' offenses and thus
aids in achieving the goal of the program, rehabilitation. 64 The Court stated
that offering immunity would "absolve many sex offenders of any and all
cost for their earlier crimes. 65
After reiterating the Fifth Amendment rights, the Court stated that the
prison setting is different from free society and therefore different
considerations must be taken into account.
66
'[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system ....' A
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 31-32. In the court's opinion, "the fact that the sanction was automatic, rather than
conditional, supported the conclusion that it constituted compulsion." Id. at 32.
60. Id. The court suggested treating the inmates' admissions as privileged or granting them
immunity. Id.
61. Id.
62. Lile, 536 U.S. at 32-35.
63. Id. at 33-34.
64. Id. at 34. The Court stated that the lack of punishment for past crimes may lead sex
offenders to think that society does not consider their crimes to be serious. This would interfere with
the rehabilitative process. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 36. The Fifth Amendment "provides that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."' Id. at 35.
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broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights
in free society falls within the expected conditions of
confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction.67
Because federal and state officials are assigned the task of administering
the prisons, they need the requisite authority to do so. 68 The Court explained
that it is from this need for authority that the limitations on prisoners'
privileges stem.
69
In describing the standard the Court previously applied in Sandin v.
Connor7 ° as a reasonable means to assessing what constitutes compulsion,
the Court asserted that in order to establish a Fifth Amendment violation, a
defendant must show that "the consequences of [his or her] choice to remain
silent are closer to the physical torture against which the [c]onstitution...
protects.' Justice Kennedy indicated that the Court has previously held in
several cases, where the ramifications faced by the defendants were much
worse than those Lile faced, that the hard choice between silence and the
consequences was not compelled.72 Stating the question presented was
"whether... [Kansas'] State[] program, and the consequences for
nonparticipation in it, combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the
constitutional right[,j" Justice Kennedy followed with an analysis of Sandin
and three prior rulings.73
1. The Sandin Ruling
Justice Kennedy first began with a description of the decision in Sandin.
The Court held "that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due
process violation unless those conditions constitute 'atypical and significant
hardship[s] on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life . 74
67. Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
68. Lile, 536 U.S. at 37.
69. Id.
70. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
71. Lile, 536 U.S. at 37.
72. Id. at 43-44.
73. Id. at 35. The Court indicated that if immunity was offered to participants, the self-
incrimination privilege would not be implicated.
74. Lile, 536 U.S. at 37. The Court ruled that:
[a]t the time of [Conner's] punishment, disciplinary segregation mirrored those
conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody
.... And, his confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement
in either duration or degree of restriction .... [T]he chance that the misconduct finding
will affect his parole status is simply too attenuated to invoke the Due Process Clause's
procedural guarantees.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 487.
In Sandin v. Conner, prisoner Conner brought a civil rights action
against Hawaii prison officials and the state of Hawaii for imposing
segregated confinement for misconduct. 75  The defendant claimed that
officials had deprived him of procedural due process when he was not
permitted to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.76 The Court ruled
that there was no Due Process Clause violation.77 It stated that "Conner's
discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest. 78  The plurality in Lile announced that although the ruling in
Sandin may not provide a "precise parallel" for determining if there is
compelled self-incrimination, it does provide useful guidelines for
determining whether conditions constitute "atypical and significant
hardships. ' 79  Its reasoning for believing that Sandin provides a useful
guideline is that the Court in Sandin "underscore[s] the axiom that a
convicted felon's life in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen."8 °
The plurality stated that because McKune v. Lile involves the context of a
prisoner rehabilitation program, the same considerations utilized in Sandin
are relevant to Lile.81
2. Analysis of the Present Case
The Court declared the appropriate test for a Fifth Amendment violation
in the context of a prison rehabilitation program as such:
A prison [] rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to
bear a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective,
does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the
adverse consequences an inmate faces for not participating are
related to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical
and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.82
The plurality then continued on and applied the test to the facts of the
present case.83
The plurality first pointed out that Lile's refusal to participate in the
program did not extend his incarceration period nor affect his eligibility for
"good-time credits" or parole. Additionally, his transfer from a medium-
security unit to a maximum-security unit was due to limited space for those
participating in programs, and was not intended as a punishment for
75. Id. at 475.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 487.
78. Id. at 486.
79. Lile, 536 U.S. at 37.
80. id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 37-38.
83. ld. at 37-41.
84. Id. at 38.
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exercising his Fifth Amendment rights." What the plurality did not address
was why all his other privileges were reduced as well. Wasn't this added
reduction a punishment? This is where the plurality tried to classify the
consequences imposed upon Lile for not participating in the SATP as more
like a denial of privileges than a penalty.86 It claimed that enhancing the
punishment imposed upon Lile, transfer to maximum-security, was no
different than "denying him the 'leniency' he claims would be appropriate if
he had cooperated," i.e., remaining in medium-security. 87 But the prison
didn't just move Lile to another facility, they reduced all his hard earned
privileges from Level III to Level I status. 88 The plurality addressed this
issue by stating that "[a]n essential tool of prison administration ... is the
authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave. The Constitution
accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these prerequisites
as they see fit."'8 9
The plurality further emphasized its position, that inmates must expect
restrictions by the mere fact of their conviction, by discussing Hewitt v.
Helms.90 In that case, the Court held that an inmate's transfer to a different
facility, which resulted in the loss of access to a multitude of programs, did
not implicate a liberty interest.9' The Court stated that there is no
requirement that the government make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment
cost free. 92
3. Analysis of Prior Rulings & Comparison with Lile
After analyzing the standard set forth in Sandin and applying it to the
facts in Lile, the plurality turned to three cases in which the Court found no
Fifth Amendment violation and compared these cases to Lile.93 The cases
utilized for comparison were Baxter v. Palmigiano,94 Minnesota v.
Murphy,95 and Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard.96 The theory
85. Lile, 536 U.S. at 38.
86. Id. at 45-46.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 39.
90. 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983).
91. Lile, 536 U.S. at 39.
92. Id. at 41; see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 23 (1980) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment was not violated by use of a pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility).
93. Lile, 536 U.S. at 42. The Court also briefly compared Lile to McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971) (upholding a procedure that allowed a defendant's statements made for the purposes
of avoiding the death penalty to be used against him as evidence). Id. at 42. The plurality stated that
the consequences faced by Lile were much less than those faced by McGautha. Id.
94. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
95. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
96. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
behind the comparison was to show that because the defendants in these
cases faced much worse penalties than Lile, and the Court found no
constitutional violation in each of them, Lile's situation did not equal a
constitutional violation either.
97
The first case discussed by the Court was Baxter.98  In Baxter,
Palmigiano, an inmate of the California penal institution in San Quentin,
filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the disciplinary
procedures at the prison violated his due process rights. 99 The defendant
objected to the fact that his silence at a disciplinary hearing would be held
against him and sought damages and injunctive relief.'0° The Court in
Baxter acknowledged that, according to the rule in Griffin v. California,' °
"the Fifth Amendment prohibits courts from instructing a criminal jury that
it may [infer guilt] from a defendant's failure to testify. °10 2 However, the
Baxter Court refused to "extend the Griffin rule to the context of state prison
disciplinary hearings because [they] 'involve the correctional process and
important state interests other than conviction for crime. '"10' 3 The Lile
plurality pointed out that where Lile faced the loss of certain privileges for
asserting his right to remain silent, Palmigiano faced thirty days in punitive
segregation in addition to a reduction in prison status.' °4 The plurality stated
that this hard choice was greater than the one faced by Lile, yet the Court
still found no compulsion, and thus no constitutional violation.'
05
The second case the plurality analyzed was Murphy.10 6  In 1980,
Murphy pleaded guilty to a sex-related charge and, as a condition of his
probation, was required to participate in a sex offense treatment program and
to be honest "in all matters" when meeting with his probation officer.
1 0 7
Murphy's probation officer, knowing Murphy had admitted to his treatment
counselor that he had committed a rape and murder, questioned Murphy
about the alleged incident.1 0 8 Murphy, fearful of being returned to prison if
he remained silent, admitted guilt.'0 9 As a result of this admission, he was
later indicted for first-degree murder."0  Murphy sought to suppress the
confession, stating that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.' The Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, despite Murphy's
97. See Lile, 536 U.S. at 42-45.
98. Id. at 42-43.
99. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 313-14.
100. Id. at 313.
101. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
102. Lile, 536 U.S. at 42.
103. Id. (quoting Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319).
104. id. at 42-43.
105. Id.
106. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
107. Id. at 422.
108. ld. at 423-24.
109. Id. at 422-425.
110. Id. at 425. Marshall Murphy had been questioned twice about the rape and murder of a
teenage girl, but no charges were ever filed. Id. at 422. It wasn't until he was serving probation for
a separate charge of false imprisonment that he admitted to the previous rape and was charged for
the crime. Id. at 423-25.
111. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425.
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fear of returning to prison, and stated that "since [he] revealed incriminating
information instead of timely asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, his
disclosures were not compelled incriminations." ' 12 The plurality utilized the
facts of this case to illustrate by comparison that the consequences faced by
Lile did not amount to compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
since the conditions faced by Murphy, which were far worse, did not."3
The final case analyzed by the plurality for comparison with Lile was
Woodard.' 4  Eugene Woodard was convicted of aggravated murder and
sentenced to death.1 5  Even though Woodard had not requested an
interview, a clemency hearing was scheduled for him."l6 He objected to the
short notice and requested that counsel be present, but both requests went
unanswered." 17  In response, Woodard filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,
alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. 1 8  "[He] claimed to face a Hobson's choice: He would
damage his case for clemency no matter whether he spoke and incriminated
himself, or remained silent and the clemency board construed that silence
against him."' 19 The Court ruled that "the pressure [Woodard] felt to speak
to improve his chances of clemency did not constitute unconstitutional
compulsion.' 120 This analysis was the plurality's final attempt at showing
that Lile was not compelled to incriminate himself, by means of comparing
his situation to that of a defendant faced with far worse conditions in which
the Court stated there was no compelled self-incrimination.'12
After discussing each of the previous rulings, the plurality declared that
the consequences Lile faced were not substantial enough to create
unconstitutional compulsion; they were merely losses of privileges bearing a
rational relation to the legitimate penological objectives of rehabilitation and
deterrence. 122 The plurality also briefly addressed the dissent's attempt to
distinguish these cases from Lile.123 The dissent pointed out two issues in
112. Id. at 440.
113. Lile, 536U.S. at43.
114. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
115. Id. at 277. Eugene Woodard was convicted of aggravated murder committed during a
carjacking. He was given the death penalty and appealed his sentence. The Appeals Court affirmed
his death sentence. Id.
116. Id. The Ohio Constitution gives the Governor the power to grant clemency, but that power
has been delegated to the Ohio Adult Parole Authority. Id. at 276. A clemency hearing must be
conducted within forty-five days of the execution date and then a recommendation will be made to
the Governor. Id. at 276-77.
117. Id. at 277.
118. Id.
119. Lile, 536 U.S. at 43.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 44-45.
123. Id. at 43-44.
the case: 1) the fact that Lile's penalties followed automatically from
choosing to remain silent and, 2) that Lile was directed to participate in the
SATP rather than given the choice.1 24 The plurality stood by its decision and
stated that:
[w]hile the automatic nature of the consequence may be a
necessary condition to finding unconstitutional compulsion,
however, that is not a sufficient reason alone to ignore
Woodard, Murphy, and Baxter .... [O]ne cannot answer the
question whether the person has been compelled to incriminate
himself without first considering the severity of the
consequences. 125
In response to the dissent's second argument regarding the involuntary
nature of the program, the plurality stated that the entire compulsion analysis
depends on the consequences of deciding not to participate, not the nature of
the program. 1
26
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor delivered a concurring opinion. 27 She stated that she
agreed with the plurality's decision that the consequences facing Lile for his
refusal to speak did not amount to compulsion for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 2 8 In fact, she described the changes in his living
conditions and reduction of his prison privileges as minor. 129  Justice
O'Connor did, however, disagree with the plurality on the standard for
compulsion. 30 She took the position of Justice Stevens, a dissenting Justice,
and stated that the "Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than
the 'atypical and significant hardship' standard [the Court] ha[s] adopted for
evaluating due process claims in prisons ....
Justice O'Connor announced that she believes imposing the risk of
punishment is acceptable "so long as the actual imposition of such
punishment is accomplished through a fair criminal process."'132  Before
ending her opinion, Justice O'Connor commented on her discontent with the
124. Id. at 44.
125. Lile, 536 U.S. at 44.
126. Id. at 44-45.
127. Id. at 48-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 48-49.
129. Id. at 51.
Because the prison is responsible for caring for respondent's basic needs, his ability to
support himself is not implicated by the reduction in wages he would suffer as a result.
While his visitation is reduced as a result of his failure to incriminate himself, he still
retains the ability to see his attorney, his family, and members of the clergy.
Id.
130. Id. at 52-53.
131. Lile, 536 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
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plurality's failure to "set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 13
3
C. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, delivered a dissenting opinion. 34  The dissent agreed with the
plurality that offering incentives to prisoners to participate in a program does
not amount to compulsion. 135 However, this is where agreement with the
plurality opinion ended. 136 The dissent actually restated the issue at hand as
"whether the State may punish an inmate's assertion of his Fifth Amendment
privilege with the same mandatory sanction that follows a disciplinary
conviction for an offense such as theft, sodomy, riot, arson, or assault.' 37 It
disagreed with the plurality's characterization of the sanctions as modest and
stated that they are actually quite severe. 138 It declared that the benefit of
obtaining sex offense confessions does not justify evisceration of the Fifth
Amendment. 1
39
The dissent stated that none of the Court's prior opinions suggests that
the, prison context should narrow the protection of any established right or
give a different meaning to compulsion. 40 It then began to distinguish the
cases discussed by the plurality from the facts at issue in this case. The first
case discussed was Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard.'4' The dissent
pointed out that Lile was ordered to participate in the SATP, as opposed to
the respondent in Woodard, who voluntarily participated in an interview.1
42
It stated that "[1]ike a direct judicial order to answer questions in the
courtroom, an order from the State to participate in the SATP is inherently
coercive."'' 43 The dissent also added that the automatic nature of the penalty
for refusing to participate further established the presence of coercion.' 44
The next case distinguished by the dissent was Baxter.'4 5 The Court in
Baxter declared that it was "undisputed that an inmate's silence in and of
itself [was] insufficient to support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary
133. Id.
134. Lile, 536 U.S. at 54-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 54.
136. See id.
137. Lile, 536 U.S. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 54-55.
141. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
142. Lile, 536 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 60.
144. Id.
145. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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Board."' 146 The dissent stated that, unlike the situation in Lile where the
penalty for silence was automatically imposed, refusing to incriminate
oneself "was only one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder
of fact in assessing a penalty" in Baxter.
147
The dissent then turned to Murphy. 48 In Murphy, the Court stated that
according to a Minnesota statute, probation revocation was not automatic for
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. 149  The dissent pointed out the
difference between Lile and Murphy, stating that there was merely a risk of
consequences for a voluntary choice in Murphy verses automatic sanctions
for disobeying an order to participate in the SATP in Lile. 5°
The dissent stated that the plurality disregarded the automatic nature of
the penalty and the voluntary nature of the program when making their
decision.15' It declared this to be an "unjustified departure" from prior
rulings. 52  "[T]he plurality must point to something beyond respondent's
status as a prisoner to justify its departure from our precedent."'' 53
The next section of the dissenting opinion focused on the actual
privileges to be revoked for refusal to participate in the SATP. 154  The
dissent stated that although the plurality viewed the consequences as the
mere loss of potential benefits or as insignificant penalties, it strongly
disagreed. 5 5 It emphasized that it took Lile six years to obtain his Level III
prison status; a level to which he would not be able to earn his way back in
his remaining time in prison. 56 Taking this status away would not only
result in dignitary harms, but in loss of tangible privileges as well. 157 The
dissent stated that inmates develop certain expectations over time regarding
the conditions of their confinement.5 8  "These conditions... form the
baseline against which any change must be measured, and rescinding them
now surely constitutes punishment. '5 9 The Court has established that the
government can offer benefits to those willing to provide incriminating
information, but that it cannot threaten to take away privileges for asserting
the right to remain silent.' 6°
146. Lile, 536 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317).
147. Id.
148. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
149. Lile, 536 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Murphy could not reasonably have feared that
the assertion of the privilege would have led to revocation." Id.
150. See id. at 61-62.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 62.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 62-68.
155. Lile, 536 U.S. at 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. The Court stated that this type of sanction is the same imposed upon those who commit
serious disciplinary infractions. See id. at 63.
157. Id. Lile's earning capacity would be lowered, his canteen expenditures would be reduced,
the amount of personal property allowed in his cell would be decreased, and he would be transferred
to a maximum-security unit from his medium-security unit. Id. at 63.
158. Lile, 536 U.S. at 64.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 65.
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The dissent asserted that the plurality blurred the lines between penalties
and incentives.' 6' It stated that the plurality found no problem with modest
sanctions as long as they are not given a punitive label, hence the label of
"loss of privileges."'' 62 It also pointed out that the plurality contended that
the reduction in prison status and transfer from medium-security to
maximum-security was merely for the purpose of freeing up more space for
those who chose to participate in the program, not as a penalty. 63  The
dissent addressed this argument by stating that no evidence was presented to
show a shortage of space for participants, thus making "the only plausible
explanation for the transfer ... [to be] punishment for refusing to participate
in the program.'' 64 The dissent concluded that the aggregate effect of the





The plurality focused on its prior rulings and analyzed the definitions of
compulsion and incrimination, but it never spent any time discussing what
actually constitutes compulsion in the prison context. 66 It discussed the fact
that prison life is different from free society and that prisoners' rights have
limitations placed upon them, but failed to state how far those limitations
go. 167 The plurality did, however, provide some broad views about factors to
consider when evaluating whether compulsion occurred. 168 It stated that
"[t]he compulsion inquiry must consider the significant restraints already
inherent in prison life and the State's own vital interests in rehabilitation
goals and procedures within the prison systems."'' 69 It even declared that the
Sandin ruling provided useful instruction for determining whether compelled
self-incrimination exists. 70 However, the plurality failed to provide even
161. Id.
162. Id. at 64.
163. Id. at 66.
164. Lile, 536 U.S. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 68-71. "No matter what the goal, inmates should not be compelled to forfeit the
privilege against self-incrimination simply because the ends are legitimate or because they have been
convicted of sex offenses." Id. at 71.
166. See id. at 29-38.
167. Id. at 36-39.
168. Id. at 37-40.
169. Id. at 37.
170. Lile, 536 U.S. at 37-38.
one example of what constitutes a severe enough consequence, in the prison
context, to amount to a Fifth Amendment violation.17
So what actually constitutes compulsion in the prison context? That
question was never really answered.7 2 The plurality spent a good amount of
time comparing the facts of Lile to prior cases in which the Court found no
Fifth Amendment violation. 173 It looked at Woodard, Baxter, and Murphy,
and as a result, declared there to be no constitutional violation in Lile. 174 It
appeared that it was almost stating, since the conditions faced by the
prisoners in those cases were much worse than Lile faced in this case, and
there was no compulsion in those cases, that there must not be compulsion
here.
The plurality also made the argument that removal of a privilege does
not constitute a significant penalty, or really a penalty at all. 175 But in the
prison context, if an inmate has earned privileges and has been living with
those privileges for some time, it appears that taking them away would
constitute a penalty.1 76 It seems that the line between a penalty and the loss
of a privilege has been blurred.
Time will ultimately tell whether the plurality's broad application of
Sandin will be followed in future opinions. Although this issue is clearly not
one of a black and white nature, it appears to demand a narrower rule in
order to prevent injustice. 177 As more Fifth Amendment compelled self-
incrimination cases are filed by prisoners, the Court will have to design a
clearer test, or risk increasing the level of infringement upon prisoners'
rights. 178
B. Legislative and Social Impact
The plurality's interpretation of Sandin and its application to the facts in
Lile substantially impact the rights of prisoners, specifically sex offenders. 179
As time passes, the broad application of the rule will expand to include more
and more offenses as permissible consequences for invoking the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. It will end up resulting in the
oversight of compulsion in order to advance legitimate penological goals.'
80
The dissent properly addressed this issue when it said:
[u]ntil today the Court has never characterized a threatened
harm as 'a minimal incentive.' Nor have we ever held that a
person who has made a valid assertion of the [Fifth
171. See id. at 30-38.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 42-45.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 43-45.
176. Lile, 536 U.S. at 61-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 53-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. See id.
179. Id. at 39-43.
180. See id. at 54-56.
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Amendment] privilege may nevertheless be ordered to
incriminate himself and sanctioned for disobeying such an
order. This is truly a watershed case.
18 1
In order to truly provide the right against self-incrimination to prisoners,
Congress must clearly define what constitutes sufficiently severe
consequences to create compulsion in the prison setting and implement a
change in rehabilitation programs to protect sex offenders. 182
VI. SOLUTIONS
A. Immunity
"The interests at stake in the adjudication of sex offenders are naturally
opposed to each other. On one hand, the Fifth Amendment protects the
offender's interest in ... privacy .... On the other hand, the state has
strong dual interests in rehabilitating the offender and protecting its
citizens."' 83 Offering SATP participants immunity can satisfy both of these
interests.' 84 It would also eliminate future Fifth Amendment constitutional
violations and challenges with regard to sex abuse rehabilitation
programs. 85  The plurality itself stated that if inmates were offered
immunity, the self-incrimination privilege would not be implicated. 8 6
However, the concern with offering immunity is that participants will not
take their past crimes seriously, thus causing an interference with the
rehabilitative process. 
87
"The reality that offenders are sentenced to treatment programs
involuntarily, the tendency of sex offenders to be especially prone to denial,
and offenders' fears regarding the incriminating consequences of disclosing
their offenses, all challenge an offender's capacity to participate successfully
in treatment programs."'' 88 Eliminating denial and accepting responsibility
for past sexual misconduct is key to rehabilitation. 89 With the provision of
immunity, participants would be able to discuss their past wrongs and learn
181. Id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 47.
183. Kaden, supra note 9, at 382.
184. Id. at 385.
185. See id.
186. Lile, 536 U.S. at 35.
187. Id.
188. Kaden, supra note 9, at 385-86.
189. See id. at 366-67. "[D]enial must be overcome for therapeutic work to proceed effectively."
Id. at 367.
from them without the fear of their admissions being used to convict them
later. 190
Another concern with offering immunity is that it eliminates the
possibility of pursuing criminal prosecution for participants' past sex
crimes.1 91 This should not be a worry.
"[T]he privilege [against self-incrimination] has never been construed to
mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. [The] sole
concern is to afford protection against being 'forced to give testimony
leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to ... criminal acts."'1 92
Therefore, a participant could still be prosecuted based upon independent
evidence; it is only his statements that could not be used against him.193 It
appears that offering immunity to SATP participants provides a solution that
benefits both sides equally; the state may still rehabilitate sex offenders and




Approaches to treatment can be modified to protect the participants'
Fifth Amendment rights while also satisfying the rehabilitative and
deterrence goals of the state. 9 The form of treatment currently practiced by
the Kansas SATP is called the confrontational approach. 9 6 This approach
revolves around getting the offender to come to terms with his behavior and
admit his offenses. 197 Denial is not tolerated. 98 It is in this type of situation
that self-incrimination issues may arise.' 99 Offenders are forced to admit
guilt as a first step to rehabilitation. ° °
An alternative to the confrontational approach is the motivational
approach.201  "While the confrontational approach may confirm 'in the
offender[] the feeling that [he has] no control over [his] behavior and that
controls have to be imposed,' the motivational approach attempts to
engender a desire within the offender to change-to do something for
himself.' 20 2 Negotiation tactics are utilized in this approach, as opposed to
the forced confession tactics of the confrontational approach.2 3 Some view
this approach as being soft on offenders. M
190. Id. at 367.
191. Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
192. Tanabe, supra note 6, at 850 (citing New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1979)).
193. Lile, 224 F.3d at 1192.
194. Kaden, supra note 9, at 385-86.
195. See id. at 365-370.
196. Id. at 368.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 29-33 (2002).
200. Id. at 33-34.
201. Kaden, supra note 9, at 368.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 368-69.
204. See id. at 369.
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Finally, there are other modes of treatment that do not utilize the
confrontational approach nor revolve around forcing participants to admit
responsibility.0 5  One of these alternative methods is called
metaconfrontation. °6
[M]etaconfrontation... recognizes the protective function that
denial serves for offenders, and aims to induce eventual acceptance
of responsibility by expressing empathy for the offenders' initial
need to deny .... [It] is directed toward offenders who do not
respond well to direct confrontation and who might otherwise have
been deemed untreatable because of the perceived intransigence of
their denial.2 °7
This approach is best suited for offenders who are dependent upon their
defenses.208 It is aimed at exposing the bases for denial and then dealing
with them so that the offender may accept responsibility for his actions.20 9
There are no forced confessions in this method, thus avoiding Fifth
Amendment constitutional issues.1 0
VII. CONCLUSION
"The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provides us with
some of our most treasured protections. 2 i l Although the Lile decision
provided some very broad guidelines for how to determine whether a Fifth
Amendment violation has occurred, it did not specifically rule on what
constitutes compulsion in the prison context.2 12 It left a gap that could
potentially increase the severity of constitutional violations; a gap that could
be closed with some narrower guidelines.2 3
The Kansas SATP is a program that has significantly attributed to the
rehabilitation of sex offenders. 1 However, contrary to the plurality's
conclusion, the way in which the program operates increases the likelihood
of violating a prisoner's Fifth Amendment rights.215 This problem may be
remedied in a number of ways: 1) by the above mentioned suggestion of
205. See id.
206. See id. at 370.




211. State v. Reyes, 2 P.3d 725, 733 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000).
212. Lile, 536 U.S. at 47.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 34.
215. See id. at 70-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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narrowing the guidelines to determine what consequences are significant
enough to create compulsion;2 16 2) by offering immunity to participants,
thereby eliminating the possibility of Fifth Amendment violations; 217 or 3)
by implementing alternative forms of treatment.18
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